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i Abstract 
This paper explores the history of American patent law in relation to classical liberalism 
and classical republicanism.  In a basic sense liberalism emphasizes the importance of 
individuals, while republicanism underscores individual sacrifice for the good of the community.  
A patent creates a temporary monopoly privilege for an individual to encourage disclosure of 
his invention to the public.  On the one hand, patent law exists to protect an individual’s claim 
to his invention.  On the other hand, patent law exists to facilitate the transfer of ideas into the 
common knowledge pool.  In this way, a patent balances an individual’s property right with an 
obligation to sacrifice exclusive hold over an idea by publishing that idea from which the 
community may benefit. 
A historical analysis indicates that classical liberalism and classical republicanism balance 
and shape the development of early patent law. Now, the emergence of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies has created new concerns adding layers of complexity to the law.  
These modern developments make the balance between these ideologies more difficult to 
discern and distort traditional attentions of both. Although new issues dominate patent law, 
these theories of governance still linger below the surface and a debate between individualism 
and altruism reappears during the most recent legislation, influencing patent law. 
Inadvertently, this debate is shallow, and overlooks problems of the modern patent system, 
demonstrating the power of classical liberalism and classical republicanism to obscure political 
reality in patent law. 
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 “Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, 
liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his 
share to the expense of this protection; and to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when 
necessary. -John Adams, Thoughts on Government, 1776 
“[O]thers, like the pharmaceutical industry, oppose any change to drug pricing, no matter how 
justifiable and modest, because they believe it threatens their profits.” --Barack Obama: United 
States Health Care Reform Progress to Date and Next Steps, 2016 
ii Introduction 
In 1787, representatives from across the nation met in Philadelphia to revise the Articles 
of Confederation.  Instead of revising the Articles, the result was a new Constitution.  Although 
the issues of representation and taxation took center stage at the Convention, the Constitution 
addressed a spectrum of issues including patents.  Article 1 section 8 of the Constitution gives 
congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing, for 
limited times to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”1 
American patent law originates from 16th century British law.  In the 16th century, it 
was common for the British royal family to grant monopoly rights.  Patents were intended to 
promote the growth of new industries but were abused by the Crown.  The British Royal Family 
used patents to generate revenue and patronage without collecting taxes.  In response, 
Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies in 1623 to repeal patents granted “upon…untrue 
[pretenses] of [the] public good.”2  Monopolies for “any manner of new manufactures… to the 
true and first inventor” remained protected in section 6 of the document.  Following this 
tradition, patents in colonial America resembled the British system closely.  This typically meant 
                                                          
1 U.S. Const. art. I, section 8, clause 8. 
2 English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, section 1. 
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patents were granted for an invention or new industry, however, in some cases patents were 
also granted for well-established industries such as candle making.3 
The Constitution gives Congress the ability to make deals with inventors whereby 
inventors are compensated with temporary monopolies in return for disclosing their secrets to 
the public.  In the context of American political governance theory, classical liberalism is 
concerned with the rights of the individual, while classical republicanism emphasizes the 
importance of altruistic contributions to the community.  In American patent law, private 
property rights are issued to protect and encourage creative innovation, but with the 
stipulation that the invention must be disclosed to the public.  In this sense patent rights are 
dual in their purpose.  On the one hand, they treat an idea as private property, granting 
exclusive access. Like ownership of tangible property, exclusive ownership of an invention 
allows inventors to recuperate costs and generate profits using their intellectual capital.  On the 
other hand, this property right exists only for a limited time and requires full disclosure, to 
allow knowledge to diffuse into public domain allowing the community to utilize the invention. 
An analysis of patent law is a valuable exercise for scholars of both liberalism and 
republicanism because patent law has changed in small increments and appears to reflect 
concerns of both ideologies throughout the course of its political development.  Beginning with 
the signing of the Constitution, American patent law can be depicted as navigating an 
unpredictable path between accentuating individual property rights and restricting the 
eligibility of patentable material to promote the transfer of ideas.  In the early history, 
                                                          
3 Floyd L. Vaughan, The United States Patent System: Legal and econom. conflicts in American patent history 
(Norman (Oklahoma): Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 14-16. 
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legislators were concerned with the issues of the burgeoning democracy leaving judges to shift 
the balance between individual rights and the public interest in patent law.  In more recent 
history, judges and legislators appear less concerned with patent law’s relation to an 
individual’s property rights. Instead, the interests of large corporations dominate patent law.  
Ironically, some legislators continue to conceptualize the patent system as an instrument that 
allows the small inventor to achieve financial success cultivate the common good.  Sadly, this 
view appears to be an overly idealistic and fails to consider the current challenges for small 
entities.  Large companies, such as those in the pharmaceutical industry, dominate the legal 
process because of extreme costs of litigation and complexities of the law. This places 
independent inventors at an immense disadvantage in the patent process. This phenomenon 
demonstrates the power of classical liberalism and republicanism to influence American 
political actors. Without pressure from their constituents or consideration of the current 
conditions, politicians rekindle an emotional debate between individual property rights and the 
common good in an inappropriate setting.  This element of American political culture has 
created dangerous stagnation in American Patent law that must be addressed moving forward. 
Patent law can be powerful tool for society if addressed properly.  
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iii Literature Review 
Lockean liberalism has been an important force in American political development. 
Louis Hartz explains the importance of liberalism on American political culture in his book 
Liberal Tradition in America. He uses liberalism in the “classical Lockean sense” in which citizens 
have innate rights to life, liberty, and property.4 Hartz argues the values of Lockean liberalism 
suited the American populace because there is no feudal system in the New World.  Lockean 
liberalism thrived on a “storybook truth about American history: that America was settled by 
men who fled from the feudal and clerical oppressions of the Old World.”5  
American political traditions have reinforced liberal principles. Hartz identifies several 
political phenomena that may have preserved Lockean ideas in patent law.  In many cases the 
devotion to the Constitution and the “Lockean doctrine…has been [noticeably] irrational.”6   In 
explaining the persistence of the liberal tradition, Hartz mentions “the unusual power of the 
Supreme Court.”7 Hartz argues “Judicial review …would be inconceivable without acceptance of 
the Lockean creed, ultimately enshrined in the Constitution.”8  Further evidence can be seen in 
instances of Constitutional controversy. Resistance to change is based on an emotional belief of 
“some authentic and substantive quality of [the founders’ thoughts and experiences].”9 Hartz 
describes this phenomenon as a “cult of Constitutional worship,” reaffirming our commitment 
to Lockean principles, including property rights over time.10   
                                                          
4Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1991), p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p.3. 
6 Ibid., p.11 
7 Ibid., p.9. 
8 Ibid., p.9. 
9 Jack N. Rakove, "The Madisonian Moment," (1988), p.473. 
10Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1991), p.9. 
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Property is an essential component of American political culture.  A massive supply of 
available land has made the right to property a cornerstone of our republic. The importance of 
property rights resonated “[w]here land was abundant and the voyage to the new world itself a 
claim to independence.”11  In a hypothetical parallel, intellectual property creates a 
metaphysical frontier, attainable for all citizens.  An abundance of inventions tied to financial 
incentives made Americans feel they were in control of their economic destiny. This 
sentimentalized conception likely bolstered an attachment to the concept of intellectual 
property that continues into the present.  As Hartz argues, “a society which begins with 
Locke…stays with Locke, [and] by virtue of an absolute and irrational attachment it develops 
from him.”12 Hartz conceptualizes American political development along a liberal path.  
It would appear a single factor analysis fails to explain the oscillations in the 
development of patent law over time.  In Politics and Time, Paul Pierson describes the theory of 
path dependency.  Path dependency conceptualizes political development as the amplification 
of an idea, institution, or event, over time. This creates a powerful self-reinforcing cycle.  As it 
relates to patent law, path dependency does not explain its current state in some instances. For 
example, for most of patent law in America history the “first and true inventor” was prioritized 
if he followed the necessary legal diligence.  If one accepts prioritization of the “first and true 
inventor” as an extension or related branch of the property right prescribed in Lockean 
liberalism, patent law deviates from its Lockean liberal path by changing to a first-to-file system 
                                                          
11Ibid., p.17. 
12 Ibid., p.6. 
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in 2011. Thus, the theory of path dependency appears too simplistic to provide a thorough 
understanding of the ideological meaning embedded in patent law.  
Intercurrence is perhaps a more appropriate tool for this analysis.  Unlike path 
dependency, the theory of Intercurrence considers multi-causality. Intercurrence recognizes the 
various pushes and pulls of political forces in tandem. In Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory 
Building in the Fullness of Time, Orren and Skowronek visualize intercurrence as “different 
ordering principles [converging], [colliding], and [folding] onto one another” filling up three-
dimensional political space.13   
One facet of American political space is classical republicanism.  Classical republicanism 
prioritizes the common good. In Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination, 
Joyce Appleby provides historical evidence of classical republicanism in early American politics. 
Republicanism prioritized the protection and preservation of society over the interests of 
individuals.  Although there has been a tendency to show liberalism and republicanism in 
conflict with one another, Appleby argues that republicanism coexists, perhaps even 
complements liberalism.  In the 1780s, republicanism was a “final attempt to come to terms 
with the emergent individualistic society that threatened” the common good.14  “Since the men 
who led the colonial resistance movement presided over the affairs of the new nation for the 
                                                          
13 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, Political order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York 
University Press, 1996), p.138. 
14 Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and republicanism in the historical imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993), p.338. 
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next fifty years, it could reasonably be inferred that they would carry their republican world 
view with them into the nineteenth century.”15   
Patent property is consistent with core tenets of classical republican thought. Patent 
rights are meant to incentivize innovations that are beneficial to the community and create 
economic prosperity.  In classical republicanism, the “wisdom of the majority” is a valuable 
resource for governance.16 As it relates to patent law, the intellectual capital of a society is in 
part the wisdom of the majority.  In this model, intellectual property may be a shared reserve 
that can be harnessed to promote the common good. Using this lens, an “individual[‘s] thinking 
may now be viewed as a social event.”17 Classical republicanism also espouses that “only men 
secure in landed property were free to practice civic virtue.” 18 This component of classical 
republicanism provides a specific connection to patent law. In a republican leaning society “the 
innovator [is not a] hero” at all.19  As a citizen, innovation is a form of civic virtue and expected.  
In this conceptualization, Intellectual property rights give inventors the economic security to 
engage in this form of civic virtue, and forfeit an idea for the common good. 
It appears that liberal and republican theories of governance influenced the 
development of patent law concurrently. “Leaving slavery in a conceptual limbo… America 
stood for free men, free land, free institutions, and free choice.”20 In both classical liberal and 
republican theories property rights are necessary. Property in Lockean liberalism is a right of 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p.278. 
16 Ibid., p.285. 
17 Ibid, p.285. 
18 Ibid.,p.285. 
19 Ibid., p.285. 
20 Ibid., p.5. 
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the individual, while property ownership in republicanism disaggregates power, thereby 
protecting the smaller entities from domination.  In a sense, patent property does the same.  
Patent privileges protect an individual inventor by awarding intellectual property to protect the 
inventor against economic domination by citizens with no personal stake in the invention 
allowing them to engage in this form of civic virtue.   
 The history of patent law provides a unique case study for political theorists because it 
changes incrementally and remains relatively untainted by partisan politics.  The novelty of 
patent law is that the fundamentals of the modern applications have not changed significantly 
over the course of American History.  Some of the laws are closely based on legislation and 
court cases from the 18th and 19th century.  In short, by remaining apolitical, this area of the 
law has minimal political noise.  Although seeking to explain political development in relation to 
two theories of governance requires some generalization, this exercise with patent law may 
provide the clearest picture of how classical liberalism and classical republicanism balanced, 
evolved, and adapted to extraneous changes over the course of American history.   
First, Chapter 1 will examine how James Madison and Thomas Jefferson perceived 
patent law in relation to classical liberalism and classical republicanism. Next, Chapter 1 will 
analyze and discuss legislation and case law chronologically, ending with the codification of 
patent law in 1952. Chapter 2 will continue a chronological analysis of patent case law, ending 
with the America Invents Act of 2011.  Chapter 2 will conclude with an extensive analysis of the 
debate on the America Invents Act, and relate the contemporary arguments to classical 
liberalism and classical republicanism.   
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iv Chapter 1: Liberalism and Republicanism in Early Patent Law 
Patent property contains characteristics of classical liberalism and classical 
republicanism. This chapter will present the opinions of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
on patent property. After, this chapter will analyze patent legislation and case law 
chronologically to show a conceptual timeline of the patent law development between liberal 
and republican theories of governance.  
v Evidence from Madison and Jefferson  
James Madison’s conception of patent property blends individual and communitarian 
concerns. In 1792 he argues “a man has a property in his opinions… liberty of his person… [and] 
free choice.” 21 Classical liberalism emphasizes the importance of an individual’s natural right to 
property and the obligation of government to secure it. Madison reiterates this point in 1792 
when he writes “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort.”22 In Federalist 
43, Madison discusses how patent property should be conceptualized. He argues “[t]he public 
good fully coincides…with the claims of the individual” inventor.23 This quote perfectly depicts 
patent law as a balance between individual rights and the collective interests of society.  
Madison saw the court system as a valuable political mechanism with potential for 
American law. “Madison consciously preferred to bring the judiciary directly into the lawmaking 
process."24    Madison’s favorable perception of the court system and his role in drafting the 
                                                          
21James Madison, "Property,” March 29, 1792. 
22Ibid. 
23 James Madison, Federalist No. 43. 
24 Jack N. Rakove, "The Madisonian Moment," (1988), p.493. 
Fay 13 
 
patent clause may explain why the courts are given substantial power and discretion when 
interpreting patent law.  
Thomas Jefferson’s view of patents evolved over time. After the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1788 Jefferson argues against patents in a letter to Madison. He says “[t]he 
saying there shall be no monopolies, lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on 
by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time…but the benefit of even limited monopolies is too 
doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.”25 In this letter, Jefferson is 
skeptical of the benefits of temporary monopolies in relation to the common good.  Soon after 
however, Jefferson expressed the opposite opinion and supported protecting limited 
“monopolies” in the Bill of Rights.26    
Jefferson saw the communitarian value of the patent as more important than an 
individual’s claim. He makes a distinction between patent property and natural rights in 1813. 
In one letter, he argues that “the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but 
for the benefit of society.”27 In this quote, Jefferson depicts patent protection in a classical 
republican role. As one would expect, Jefferson was not a believer in “granting patents for small 
details…he [believed in] in a high standard of invention” while serving on the first board.28 
While natural rights establish the foundation for a society, Jefferson saw the patent as a 
secondary right that exists to create benefits for the community.  
                                                          
25 P. J. Federico, "Operation of the Patent Act of 1790," Journal: Patent and Trademark Office Society, (1936)., p.36. 
26 Ibid., p.36.  
27 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, August, 13,1813. 
28 Fredrico,(1936), p.37. 
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vi Evidence in Early Legislation and Case Law 
The Patent Act of 1790 relates to individual rights and the common good in some 
respects.  The Patent Act of 1790 references the “first and true inventor or discoverer.” This 
wording indicates prioritization of a patent is based on time of invention. This resembles the 
right to property in Lockean liberalism. Like an individual’s right to property is created at birth 
in Lockean liberalism, priority of a patent right is created at the inception of the invention. The 
Patent Act of 1790 features attributes of classical republicanism as well.  For example, in 
section 6, the law lists “concealment” from the public as a case where the claim of the “first and 
true” inventor would be invalidated. This condition shows that public disclosure is an integrated 
component of patent property, which suggests it exists to promote the common good at the 
same time.  
Conversely, certain components of this law suggest the patent property may not be 
ideological. Under the Patent Act of 1790, “no oath [by an applicant] was required” to affirm 
one was the first and true inventor.29  Instead, patent rights were granted to the first applicant. 
A judge could repeal the patent if there was sufficient evidence that the patentee was not the 
“first and true inventor.”30  However, the case must be initiated within one year after the 
patent was granted. The one year limit provides strong evidence that patent rights are not 
related to natural rights. Intuitively, if legislators saw a patent with the same importance as a 
citizen’s natural right to property, a one year period hardly seems sufficient. The Act of 1790 did 
not have an appeal process in the event the patent board rejected an application. Likewise, if 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p.33. 
30 The Patent Act of 1790, Section 5. 
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this right was seen on a comparable level, legislators would have likely created a secondary 
channel for individuals to appeal.  
The Patent Act of 1793 suggests early patent law was not ideological as well. For 
example, the change in 1793 “went from the extreme of a rigid examination by high 
government officials to the opposite extreme of no examination at all.”31 Under the patent 
registration system, applicants were required to swear “the originality of [their] invention” but 
if they “paid the stipulated fees [they] could secure a patent.”32 This patent law also omitted an 
appeal process for interfering applications. Section 9 of the Patent Act of 1793 stipulates in the 
“case of interfering applications” there will be an “arbitration of three persons” to determine 
who is entitled to the patent.  The reasons the arbitrators would rule in favor of the plaintiff or 
defendant are unclear, leaving the arbitrators with substantial discretion, and their decision 
was final.   
The case of Oliver Evans is an important case in the ideological development of the 
patent. Evans was issued a patent for the “useful improvement in the art of manufacturing 
meal” that expired in 1804.33  Evans petitioned congress for an extension the circuit court of 
Pennsylvania, “expressed in their unanimous opinion that the description of the machines, 
stated in the patent to have been invented by him, was imperfect and insufficient..[making the] 
trail was void.”34   Oliver was unable to appeal to the Supreme Court because the case was for a 
dispute of less than two thousand dollars. Evan’s patent was not recognized by the court 
                                                          
31 Fredrico, (1936), p. 45. 
32 Vaughan, (1956), p. 19. 
33 Congressional record: (December, 1807) p. H1058. 
34 Congressional record: (December, 1807) p. H1058. 
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because the patent office made an administrative error on his document.  The committee 
appealed to the “Secretary of State,” none other than James Madison, “for his opinion on the 
subject” and policy direction.35 The Secretary’s letter conveyed that “he [did] not think himself 
justified in introducing a principle” to patent law.36 This response indicates that Madison 
recognized the importance of patent law and indicates he saw some ideological meaning to it. 
Congress granted Evans an extension. In his petition, Evan’s argued he was not able to 
collect any “net profit” from this invention, despite following the proper diligence.37  In 
handling this petition, Congress recognized his claim as an individual, but also his value to the 
community.  A committee reported that “the petitioner appears to possess a mind capable of 
conceiving, and a strong propensity for making new discoveries and inventions, and the greater 
part of his life seems to have been devoted to improvements in labor-saving machines… his 
discoveries may be rendered useful to his country, and at the same time profitable…to 
himself.”38 The committee ultimately reinstated Evan’s patent rights arguing that he “complied 
with the patent law [and] the defect” in his document were beyond his control.39 The 
administrative error inhibited Evan’s ability to exercise his property right. Therefore, Congress 
reasoned it had an obligation to honor Evan’s agreement with the state, and encourage him to 
contribute additional innovation to society in the future.  
In Evans v. Jordan & Morehead 13 U.S. 199 (1815), the court bolstered the association 
between patent property and the natural right to property. Evans sued the defendant for 
                                                          
35 Congressional record: (December, 1807) p.  H1058. 
36 Congressional record: (December, 1807) p. H1058. 
37 Congressional record: (January, 1805) p.  H1002. 
38 Congressional record: (January, 1805) p. H1002. 
39 Congressional record: (December, 1807) p. H1059. 
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damages after receiving an extension for his patent. The Circuit Court of Virginia gave its 
opinion that the second patent was separate from the first, and gave the Plaintiff the right to 
seek damages for infringement after the second patent was issued. The lower court was divided 
on this issue and looked to the Supreme Court to confirm their conclusion. The Supreme Court, 
including Chief Justice John Marshal, agreed with the judges that, “[t]he Constitution and law, 
taken together, give to the inventor, from the moment of invention, an inchoate property 
therein, which is completed by suing out a patent…This inchoate right is exclusive [and] It can 
be invaded or impaired by no person.” The court states that although legal diligence is required 
to secure the patent right, the moment invention itself establishes the inventor’s priority to 
intellectual property.    
 Jefferson disagreed with the decision in Evans v. Jordan & Morehead 13 U.S. 199 (1815) 
and suggested had court misconstrued patent law. In a letter on this case, Jefferson suggests 
the need to “guard our citizens against harassment by law-suits.”40  Jefferson believed the 
ruling would allow litigious persons to file frivolous law suits. Jefferson was himself affected by 
Mr. Evan’s patent extension. Jefferson had built a mill on his property unaware that his device 
infringed on Mr. Evan’s rights. Evan’s requested that Jefferson pay a royalty on his mill. 
Jefferson paid the requested fee, but criticizes the courts direction in a rather sarcastic way. He 
said that Oliver’s invention “belongs to a branch of science in which, as I have before observed, 
it is not incumbent on lawyers to [study].”41 In this letter Jefferson argues that lawyers and 
                                                          
40 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson:(August, 13,1813) 
41 Ibid. 
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judges lack the necessary knowledge of science and mathematics to properly understand what 
constitutes a patentable invention.   
Legislators modified the patent system in 1836 in response to the decision in this case. 
Evans v. Jordan & Morehead 13 U.S. 199 (1815) ruled the right of the first inventor was created 
from the moment of invention. The new law in 1836 required “novelty,” meaning the applicant 
“must be [the] first to invent.”42 The courts continued to change the balance between 
liberalism and republicanism purposes in several novel case after 1836.  
In Gayler v. Wilder 51 U.S. 477 (1850) the courts diverge from a natural rights 
interpretation of patent property towards a republican purpose.  Wilder purchased the rights 
for a patent on an innovative fireproof chest design. The plaintiffs filed a suit against Wilder 
claiming he bought the patent rights from someone other than the “first true inventor.” In this 
case, Justice Daniel rules patent rights are not natural rights. He says, to argue “that the single 
circumstance of invention creates an estate or property at law… [is a] mischievous and alarming 
attempt to introduce a quasi and indefinite, indefinable, and invisible estate [independent] of 
the Constitution.”  In this quote, Justice Daniel resists the ruling in Evans v. Jordan & Morehead 
13 U.S. 199 (1815). He also makes an additional statement on patents in the context of the 
public good. He says “patent privileges are allowed as incitements to inventions and 
improvements by which the public may be benefited.” The word privilege in the ruling is 
especially important because it implies that an inventor is not entitled to a patent at all.  
                                                          
42 Vaughan, (1956), p.19. 
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In response to this case, the Supreme Court made a concurrent statement on patent 
property which distances patent law from the natural right to property. The court said that “the 
party who invents is not strictly speaking the first and original inventor [and] the law assumes 
that the improvement may have been known and used before his discovery…[ and] his patent is 
valid if he discovered it by the efforts of his own genius, and believed himself to be the original 
inventor.”43  In this instance the court states that it is irrelevant whether or not the inventor 
was first to conceive an idea at all, only that the inventor genuinely believed this is the case 
when they filed for the patent. This casts doubt on the association between liberal property 
and patent property. Furthermore it suggests that the wording “first and true” in the early laws 
may have been used to protect inventors from direct theft of their ideas rather than to 
prioritize rights base on time. 
In Consolidated Fruit-Jar co v Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1876) another court readjusts the 
relationship between public and private interests in patent law. Justice Noah Swayne states 
that patents exist for the common good and have the same legal value as physical property. In 
this case John Mason filed an infringement suit against Wright for his patent on mason jars. The 
court decided the Mason’s patent right was void because he did not file his application in the 
allotted period. The judges decided this delay this constituted public abandonment by Mason. 
In the court’s decision, Swayne says inventors “are public benefactors…[who] add wealth and 
comfort to the community and promote the progress of society.” In return the inventors are 
given a patent with the “same sanctions” as physical property. However, Mason did not 
                                                          
43 Joe Matal, "A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II., p.462. 
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disclose his invention to the public in the allotted period, as is part of the agreement. 
Therefore, his invention became “irrevocably a part of the domain which belongs to the 
community at large.”   
In another case, Densmore v. Scofield 102 U.S. 375 (1880) Judge Swayne romanticizes 
the concept of invention by associating it with genius. In this case “the court employed the 
expression ‘a flash of thought’ or genius in describing an essential characteristic of invention.  
This shows the emergence of new narrative in patent law that favors individual inventors. He 
reaffirmed his conception of a patent as having the same “rights and sanctions” as physical 
property. However, the patent, for an improvement on oil tank cars, was not created by the 
“flash of thought” or genius that the court decided was a requirement. This ruling shows an 
interesting ideological transition because the patent was associated with the mental facilities of 
the inventor, rather than the quality or usefulness of the invention itself.  
Another case, Solomon’s v. United States 137 U.S. 342 (1890) clarifies the relationship 
between an inventors. In this case the courts further separated a patent right from the 
American government. The Plaintiff was Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. He 
invented a “self-canceling revenue stamp… [that was useful] for the prevention of fraud.”  The 
plaintiff filed for a patent and sued the government for compensation. The Supreme Court 
ruled the defendant’s status as a government employee did not make his patented invention 
property of the United States Government. The court ruled the government made a profit of 
this invention and “the owner of such patent… never consented to its use…[therefore] an 
obligation on the part of the government to pay naturally arises.”  The court reasoned that 
patent property has the same attributes as tangible property in this case. The decisions states 
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that “the government has no more power to appropriate a man's property invested in a patent 
than it has to take his property invested in real estate.”  Even if the invention was created while 
working for the United States Government, the invention can become the individual’s 
temporary private property if the inventor follows the proper legal diligence.44 
vii Post WWII & Codification in 1952 
About 50 years later, Sinclair v. Interchemical 325 U.S. 327 (1945) patent law shifts 
towards a more republican purpose. In this case Judge states that patents are issued for “an 
innovation for which society is truly indebted to the efforts of the Patentee.” The Judge in this 
case reiterates the relevance of patent rights to the common good. He says “[t]he primary 
purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts 
and science…it is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure.”  This ruling shows 
the movement away from the flash of thought doctrine in Densmore v. Scofield 102 U.S. 375 
(1880). Unlike the ruling in Densmore v. Scofield 102 U.S. 375 (1880) the quality of the 
invention is the primary concern when determining the validity of a patent, rather than the 
mental capabilities of the individual.  
In 1952, American legislators passed An Act to Revise and Codify Laws Relating to 
Patents.  From June 13 through the 15th of 1951, the house committee on the Judiciary held a 
hearing on HR 3760. The “intention was not to change the law as it [was] written; the purpose 
[was] just to make it clearer.”45   
                                                          
44 There is a substantial gap in the timeline at this point in the paper due to time constraints. Further research 
should explore the period to identify other court cases related to the topic.  
45 H.R. 3760 (1951)., p.127. 
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The influence of the courts on patent law was seen with some discontent in the 
Congressional Hearing on HR 3760. Contributory infringement was one important example that 
shows some tension between Congress and the Courts. Contributory infringement was 
“established by a court decisions in suits on infringement.”46  HR 3760 established the concept 
of contributory infringement in section 271 (c) in response to this judicial decision. P.J. Fredrico 
advocated this specific statue on contributory infringement to create “a guidepost which would 
settle or determine the way the development of the law” would continue in the future.47 This 
suggest Fredrico saw a need to divert power from the judicial channel. Others at the hearing 
presented a cynical view on the courts as well.  Mr. Beyson complained in response to 
Fredrico’s suggestion saying that even with a specific provision, the Supreme Court would 
“follow its precedent by exercising its right to have the last …last say-so.”48  This shows Beyson 
was frustrated with the courts power. In another instance that demonstrates frustration Mr. 
Kent, a Canadian patent lawyer, criticizes the judicial branch for issuing low value patents in his 
testimony. He cites Supreme Court case of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Super-
Market Equipment Corporation 340 U.S. 147(1950). In this case the courts is criticized for 
issuing patents with “commercial utility but low inventive novelty.”49 Kent argues this type of 
patent offers no benefit for society, and inhibits technological progress.   
The courts are also criticized for obscuring the definition of invention in the 
Congressional Hearing on HR 3760. Kent argues” words like "invention," "creation," and so 
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48 Ibid., p.111. 
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forth, have become surrounded with an enormous enveloping cocoon of metaphysical hocus-
pocus.”50  He uses the case of Densmore v. Scofield 102 U.S. 375 (1880) in which “the court 
employed the expression a flash of thought or genius” to demonstrate his point.   Kent argues 
the flash of genius doctrine is "really nothing more than a concealed way of asserting that the 
only thing entitled to a patent is that which evokes the gasp of amazement and the state of 
emotional bedazzlement.”51  In Kent’s view the court added an emotional component to the 
law that does not relate to its purpose.  
Pharmaceutical corporations are a new concern that can be observed in this hearing. By 
changing the definition to include “composition of matter,” law makers incorporate the 
pharmaceutical patents into the law.52 This change was in response to case of Funk Brothers 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). In this case “mixed cultures of root-nodule 
bacteria capable of inoculating the seeds” were found ineligible for receiving a patent.  They 
decided to support expanding the definition to include “composition of matter” to create a 
broader definition. Following the “decision of the Supreme Court” in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), those at the hearing argued in favor of this change 
because otherwise “[many of the patents of] pharmaceutical industry [would be] thrown 
out.”53  This subject adds new complexity to patent law.  Pharmaceuticals patents create new 
issues between the property rights of companies and individual citizens.  Price discrimination 
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makes access to medicine more expensive for the public, but is required for companies to 
recover research and development costs.  
The Congressional Hearing on HR 3760 also showed that some were concerned that 
patent law was developing in a way that placed small inventors at a disadvantage. Several 
speakers voiced their opinions that patent law was steadily becoming inaccessible for small 
business and individual inventors. For example, Kent says, “It is well suited to the circumstances 
of the great corporations because of the technical complexity of patent law and the high cost of 
litigation arising out of that complexity.”54  This concern is reminiscent of the association of 
patent property rights with the individual property rights prescribed by the Lockean doctrine. 
Kent continues patent monopolies in the modern age may become problematic because large 
companies “have vast research facilities…[allowing] them a huge advantage.”55  This concern 
becomes a recurring theme as patent law transitions into the 21st century. 
viii Summary of Analysis 
An analysis of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson on property shows a complex 
balance between classical liberalism and republicanism enshrined in patent law. Early law was 
not clear on this relationship. Thus, the courts were given immense discretion allowing case law 
to shift the balance between liberal and republican values. Inklings of this debate reappear in 
1952. For example, during the hearing in 1951, there is a concern for the rights of individual 
inventors. Likewise, some in the hearing contest patents that have little utility for the 
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community.  In addition, the discussion of pharmaceuticals companies in 1952 shows an 
immensely important development in modern patent law.  
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Ix Chapter 2: Global Concerns 
 Early patent law struggles with the tradeoff between individual rights and the common 
good. As seen in the Congressional Hearing on HR 3760 in 1951, patent law has developed to 
encompass more complex subjects. Despite the importance of patent law, legislators make only 
minor changes to patent law until the recent America Invents Act in 2011. As America 
transitions to the present patent law is about money. This chapter examines legislation and 
case law chronologically beginning in the 1990s ending with the America Invents Act in 2011. 
x A Changing System 
 The advent of the 21st Century made global intellect property rights a more important 
concern for legislators. Multilateral trade negotiations between members of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) expanded intellectual property protection to 123 
countries. An important component of this multilateral agreement was the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) negotiated in 1994. TRIPS created a minimum 
level of intellectual property requirements for members of the agreement and was an 
important step in commercializing American intellectual property abroad. 
American legislators favored increased protections for American companies to facilitate 
trade. The Intellectual Property Rights Protection Act of 1994 shows that legislators viewed 
American patent property collectively placing less importance on individual rights. On June 9, 
1994, Senator William Roth of Delaware introduced the Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
Act. The Intellectual Property Rights Protection Act of 1994 called for greater enforcement of 
TRIPS in global trade relations by the executive branch. Roth proposed giving the president 
additional power to enforce American intellectual property rights to combat international theft. 
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Roth argues a lack of intellectual property security is detrimental to American economic 
interests and implied this impacts the common good. He criticizes TRIPS for allowing “up to 10 
years for developing countries to adopt the key provisions of the agreement.”56  In this 
instance, Senator Roth depicts the common good as linked to economic performance in an 
international setting. Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey co-sponsored this Bill. He also argued 
that piracy of US IP is a significant cost on the US economy.   He suggests that an American 
company’s ability to safely commercialize and market their patents abroad is directly related to 
the jobs agenda and the wellbeing of the country. Internationally legislators generally see 
patents as shared property that gives the country a competitive advantage if properly 
protected. This act is a concrete example of the importance of patent law in American 
international trade policy in modern times. 
In the debate on Intellectual Property Rights Protection Act of 1994, pharmaceutical and 
software companies are an important concern in patent law as it relates to international trade 
policy. Roth argues “The lack of full patent protection, for example, costs the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry an estimated $5 billion per year, which, in turn, lowers R&D 
investment by $700 to $900 million on an annual basis.” 57  Likewise, he argues high tech 
companies including “computer software” lose substantial amounts “from piracy and 
infringement” each year.58  This provides further evidence of a transformation of patent 
property in the context of international trade. In a domestic setting the patent property exists 
to “promote the progress of science and useful arts” in trade it exists to promote profits. Law 
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makers are not concerned with ensuring small business have fair access in an international 
patent system.  
In State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, 927 F. Supp. 502 
(D. Mass. 1996) the validity of business methods patents was recognized. A Judge ruled in State 
Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996) 
that financial modeling software is patentable. Now, business methods patents protect a novel 
way of doing business including new forms of insurance, financial models and even tax 
strategies.  The foundation for the business method patent was a result of expanding the range 
of patentable subject matter in 1952 by substituting the word “art” for “process.”59   This 
change also seems to add a layer of complexity to patent law in a modern context. This specific 
change seems to benefit individual. Creating these types of inventions is inexpensive, and gives 
individuals the ability to compete with large companies in virtual marketplaces.   
 In another case, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C. 547 U.S. 388 (2006) ended 
mandatory permanent injunction relief which has made patents less appealing for some 
companies and individuals. In this case eBay infringed on the patent of Mercexchnage. The 
patent was for a virtual marketplace that facilitates transactions between private individuals. 
The court subjected the case to a four-factor test to determine if the patent owner required 
permanent injunctive relief.   Earlier cases created a trend where “granting an injunction 
against a patent infringer almost as a matter of course.”  However, this case established court 
further discretion. Justice Roberts said “that Infringement does not entitle a patentee to a 
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permanent injunction.” This case reduced the rewards for bringing an infringement law suit in 
that the patentee is not guaranteed compensation. The court distinguishes between types of 
entities in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C. 547 U.S. 388 (2006) in their decision. The court 
stated that Mercexchnage was a non-participating entity. Therefore, they did not fit the criteria 
of receiving a permeant relief injunction. Justice Thomas delivered the reason of the court. He 
said that Mercexchnage’s “lack of commercial activity” which showed that the company did not 
suffer “irreparable damage” from the infringement.60 In the next line of the decision, however, 
Judge Thomas states that a non-practicing entity is not necessarily exempt from this type of 
settlement. In some cases, the four-factor test should be overlooked. “For example, some 
patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer 
to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring 
their works to market.”   
This case exposes an inherent contradiction in the US patent system. This decision may 
be a protection of an individual’s property rights in theory, but in practice it creates a great 
irony. Justice Thomas states in section 261“the Patent Act declares that “patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property.”61  However, “the creation of a right is distinct from the 
provision of remedies for violation of that right.”  By eliminating the pattern of mandatory 
injunctions, the court did the opposite. “According to a 2009 economic survey commissioned by 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), in [US] patent infringement cases 
where the amount in dispute is between $1 million and $25 million, total litigation costs 
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average in excess of $3 million.” 62 Likewise, costs are driven up by the length of these 
proceedings. The WIPO reported, including the appeal process, the average duration of the 
legal proceeding is three years in 2010.63  Without a guarantee of payment in the event 
successful infringement case, individuals need to invest an unrealistic amount of money and 
time in the legal proceeding and hope they are successful and that judges compensate them 
adequately. This places small businesses at a huge disadvantage in the patent litigation process. 
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 609 F.Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) cut 
damages standards. In another landmark patent case, Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 
609 F.Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), Judge Randal Rader changed the standards in awarding 
damages in an appeal.  The case discussed the concept of patent exhaustion.  Patent 
exhaustion is the legal doctrine that limits a patent holder’s ability to control and individual 
component of their patented product after an authorized sale or licensing.  The judge cut the 
damage award in half. Instead of giving Cornell equal to the market value of the entire 
computers, he gave them damages only for the market value of the single processor that was 
infringed. The application of this legal principle cut the award from $184 to $53 million. 64 Like 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C. 547 U.S. 388 (2006) this ruling appears to make patent 
litigation more risky for small entities, giving large entities a substantial advantage. 
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xi The America Invents Act: First-to-invent 
Legislative action on patent law came to a point in 2011. The American Invents act was 
the firsts “comprehensive patent bill to be enacted since the Patent Act of 1952…[and] makes 
the most substantial changes to the law since those imposed by the Patent Act of 1836.”65   
The change to a first-file system was one of the more controversial provisions in the 
2011 Act. Section 102 changed “an invention’s priority date [to] its effectives filing 
date…[making] the United States to the first-to-file system.66   Ironically, there was little 
opposition to this alteration at first. In fact, “the issue was scarcely mentioned and was 
regarded as uncontroversial during the first five years that Congress considered proposals to 
shift the United States to a first-to-file system.”67 
Several reasonable arguments were presented to justify this change. First, using the 
filing date was clear and objective which creates legal certainly in litigation.  Second, legal 
certainly would eliminate “the expense and burden of interference proceedings and eliminate 
the need for inventors to maintain” detailed official records.68  The third argument was it would 
make the American system more like the rest of the world The United States was the only 
country that operated with a first-to-invent standard. Having a different system required 
companies and individuals “to follow and comply with two different filing systems “when 
applying for patents in other countries.69   
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These was a substantial amount of support for practical reasons. In March of 2011 
“Senators Coons and Klobuchar spoke briefly on the subject, arguing that the first-to-file system 
would be more objective and would eliminate the need to resolve priority disputes through 
interference proceedings, which were generally too expensive to be pursued by small 
inventors.” 70 Senator Coons references the founders to support his position. He says “our 
founding fathers recognized that investment in innovation will not occur without a system of 
patent rights to allow inventors to reap the fruits of their labor.” 71 Here Senator Coon argued 
the inefficiencies of the first-to-invent system require the first-to-file change to make the 
system consistent with the principle of the founders. In this lens, he saw the first-to-invent 
system as a benefit for small inventors. Several members of the Senate saw efficiency as a key 
concern as well.  Leahy cites a letter from a group of university presidents who agree that 
harmonizing “the U.S. patent system with that of our major trading partners, enabling U.S. 
inventors to compete more effectively in the global marketplace.”72    
Senator Kyl argues that first-to-file will be better for small entities. He was a staunch 
supporter of the change. Quoting testimony from Gene Quinn, “a patent lawyer who writes for 
IP Watchdog Web site,” Kyl tells the senate that “only one independent inventor has actually 
prevailed in an interference proceeding in the last 7 years.” 73  Moreover “to prevail as the first 
to invent and second to file, you must prevail in an Interference proceeding, and according to 
2005 data from the AIPLA, “the average cost through an interference is over $600,000.”74 This is 
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well beyond the financial capabilities of a small business or independent inventor. In fact, he 
points out that in most cases, “it is typically major corporations that invoke and prevail in 
interference proceedings… [and] The very cost of the proceeding alone effectively ensures that 
it is these larger parties that can benefit from this system.” 75 This shows that the first-to-invent 
system places individual inventors at a disadvantage in most cases.  
Opponents argued right of the first-to invent is a valuable piece of patent law. 
Amendment No. 133, the Feinstein Amendment, was proposed to strike the first-to-file change 
from the 2011 America invents act. She argues the “proposed transition from our first-to-invent 
system to a first-to-file system would be severely harmful to innovation, and especially 
burdensome on small inventors, startups, and small businesses.”76  Feinstein argues “that the 
first-to-file provisions would eliminate the pre‑AIA grace period [for first and true inventors 
and] …[forcing] small inventor[s] to file provisional applications before their invention[s] [are] 
fully developed.”77  Feinstein also “argued that adoption of the first-to-file system was 
unnecessary [from an efficiency standpoint], because only approximately fifty interferences 
were ordered every year, out of about 480,000 annual patent applications.”78  Meaning the 
monetary cost of the first-to-invent standard was relatively small. The benefit of prioritizing 
inventors based on the time of conception is therefore worth this small cost. 
Senator Feinstein demonstrates an emotional attachment to the first-to-invent system 
in the debate. She argues prioritization of the “first and true” inventor prevents the small 
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inventor from being steamrolled by large corporations. She believes the “genius of America is 
inventions [made in] in small garages and labs, in great ideas that come from inspiration and 
perspiration in such settings and then take off.”79  In this romanticized narrative, she references 
companies such as google, apple, and AT&T, who began in in these types of environments, and 
progressed to become a center stone of the American economy. Feinstein shows her strong 
emotions for the first-to-invent system of patent law that only exists in America. Her belief in 
this system is so strong that the democratic Senator from California joins with conservative 
“organizations …including the Gun Owners of America… and the Christian Coalition” in 
opposing the bill without her amendment. 80  
Feinstein argues that the first-to-invent standard is an important American cultural 
component of the American business environment. She displays this view when she says, “I 
believe it is critical that we continue to protect and nurture this culture of innovation, and 
preserving the first-to-invent system that has helped foster it is essential to do this.” 81 Senator 
Feinstein’s argument is very consistent with the ideological principles of classical and Lockean 
liberalism. Feinstein’s case for the first-to-file system is concerned with the rights of the 
individual and resembles the natural right to property in Lockean liberalism. She says even if 
only “one-one hundredth of 1 percent of patent applications” fall into this category, it is worth 
keeping the first-to-invent system because the rights of these American inventors are 
significant and deserve to be protected.82   
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Senator Boxer supports of the first-to-invent system citing the founders. Boxer argues 
the constitutional origin of the patent is meaningful because “We are the only country in the 
world whose Constitution specifically mentions “the inventor” in our Constitution.”83  Boxer 
takes this word choice a sacred and a protected constitutional right of the American citizenry. 
Once again Boxer argues the new bill eliminates a valuable grace period. “The [unconditional] 
grace period is important because it allows smaller entities, like startups or individual inventors, 
time to set up their businesses, seek funding, offer their inventions for sale or license, and 
prepare a thorough patent application.”84  Like Feinstein, Boxer also points out that in 
Interference proceeding where two parties claim to be the true inventor it has an impact on the 
life of a real person. Therefore, the cost they create is well worth protecting the rights small 
entities and inventors, and changing the system changes the core ideological foundation of 
American patent law.  
Senator Reid expresses concerns that the first-to-file system will harm small inventors. 
He was another major supporter of the Feinstein Amendment. Reid argued in the same way 
that “the loss of the unconditional 1-year grace period under current law” would have negative 
impacts on American inventors.85  The reality of inventing is something far more complicated 
than the change this change accounts for. Small inventors engage in a process of “many trials, 
errors, and iterations before [their invention] becomes a patent-worthy invention.” Full 
disclosure of an invention before it is complete subjects the inventor to additional risk. For 
example, if an inventor talks discusses issues with the invention with others, the new law 
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means they will be forced “worry of losing their rights if these activities result in an accidental 
disclosure” of the patentable component of the invention.86 Reid argued this change acts as an 
impediment to innovation because it forces inventors to be especially careful and secretive, 
creating lower quality patents.  
Senator Cantwell makes shows emotional attachment to the first-to-invent system as 
well. Cantwell is sympathetic to small business arguing disparities in wealth place them at a 
huge disadvantage. In some cases of invention, “The only thing the small inventor has is their 
intellectual property and a fair day in court.”87  Cantwell’s presentation of what is at stake 
further inflates the predatory narrative of large corporations. In the process, she further 
romanticizes the liberal ideological conception of the patent. The first-to-invent patent is a 
leveler and like the natural rights defined in the constitution, is something uniquely American.  
The patent is “creative opportunity” secured by the financial incentives of the Patent that 
harnesses the entrepreneurial spirit and ingenuity of individuals in society. 88 
The Feinstein Amendment is important because it shows the impact of early American 
political theory classical liberalism and classical republicanism on a modern debate. Although it 
was rejected by a vote of eighty-seven to thirteen, it shows these political theories are still 
active in the 21st century.89  The debate in the House mirrors the Senate in this respect. In June, 
the House considered a similar amendment proposed by Representative Jim Sensenbrenner.   
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There was substantial opposition in the House of Representatives to the first-file 
change. “During the House constitutionality debate, Representatives Lamar Smith and Bob 
Goodlatte argued that early American patent law’s registration system was similar …[and] 
confirm the constitutionality of the first-to-file.”90  Smith argues specifically that the first-to-
invent system creates “the belief that” patents can easily be obtained by the first to invent, 
“when, in reality, interferences are prohibitively expensive.”91 He says this “lulls inventors into a 
false sense of security.”92 Likewise the benefits for American companies engaging in 
international trade are an important argument made by proponents. 
Some rejected the global appeal of a first-to-file system in the House. Rohrabacher 
argues against the first-to-file change on an anti-globalization platform. Rohrabacher argues the 
United States has “the strongest patent system in the world” and rejects the bill because it 
“change[s] the fundamentals of this system… to harmonize with weaker systems.” 93 Although 
this argument seems to rely on the fallacy of American exceptionalism, Rohrabacher’s position 
rejects globalization. He argues changing the law to suit the interests of multinational 
corporations elevates has a negative impact on the American people. He argues “multinational 
corporations, they're creating jobs overseas [and] don't care if the jobs are lost” domestically if 
it creates larger profits.” 94 This statement identifies a disagreement on who the patent exists to 
benefit, as well as a disagreement on who constitutes the American community.  
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Several politicians in the House make constitutional arguments against the change to 
the first-to-file system. Rohrabacher argues, ‘‘Inventor’’ is in the Constitution, ‘‘filers’’ is not in 
the Constitution.”95   The constitutional origins mean that Americans have “constitutionally 
protected patent rights” that cannot be infringed in the same way as the rights enumerated in 
the bill of rights.   Likewise, Representative Capture argues “the bill denies a patent to the 
actual inventor simply because he or she files second.”96  Capture sees this as an example of 
excessive bureaucratization. 
Another Representative makes an argument that patent rights are related to natural 
rights during the debate. Scott Garrett says “the Founders rejected the idea that rights are 
bestowed to the people by the government in favor of the revolutionary principle that men are 
born with natural rights.”97  This is consistent with Lockean liberal thought. He continues, 
“Inventions created by the fruits of intellectual labor are the property of the inventor… and only 
these first and true inventors [is] entitled to public protection of their rightful property.”98 
Intellectual property is a grey area in the sense that it’s not tangible like a plot of land. Garrett 
makes the argument the constitution bridges the gap between physical and mental effort. 
American collectively believe that if you work hard you can become successful. The patent 
serves to protect the autonomy of the individual inventor to pursue this intellectual property 
and use it as a source of capital by providing public protection from predatory companies. By 
granting a patent to the first to file a patent application, if they are not the first inventor, the 
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government strips the true inventor of theirs rights in some cases, and transfers property to 
another arbitrarily. For this reason, Garrett argues, “To remain true to the principles of liberty, 
we must preserve a system that protects the true and first inventor.” 99  
 The vote in the house shows the change was quite controversial. Like the Feinstein 
Amendment, the Sensenbrenner was defeated. However, this was by a much closer margin of 
129 to 295. Something the opposition said on the floor resonated with almost a third of the 
Representatives.  
xii The America Invents Act: Pharmaceuticals and Section 37 
Section 37 of the America Invent Act is an important example of the importance of 
money in modern patent law. In 2001 application extension was denied a patent-term 
extension to Medicine Company for a drug because the application “was filed outside of the 
sixty-day statutory deadline.”100 The patent term extension extends the coverage to the time 
the product was under government scrutiny. The company was unable to collect “legal 
malpractice insurance” because the “value of this patent-term extension was approximately 
one and a half billion dollars.” 101 
 An amendment to change the deadline for Medicine Company surfaced in the House. 
Representative Conyers offered the Amendment. He called this amendment a “technical 
revision” to prevent “confusion regarding the deadline for patent term extension 
applications.”102 Instead, this amendment clearly changed the deadline in favor of Medicine 
                                                          
99 Congressional record:(March 2011) p.H4422 
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Company. Some members of the house expressed discontent with the amendment. One voice 
against the Amendment was Representative Lamar Smith. He called it what it was “a special fix 
for one company.”103 Others agreed with Smith, and the House took the amendment to a vote.  
 The amendment passed the House in a dramatic way. At first the vote was 209-208 
against. In response to this outcome several members were outraged and “a member 
eventually obtained unanimous consent to vitiate the initial vote (virtually unheard of on the 
House floor)” and a second vote occurred.104   In a dramatic ending, “the amendment passed by 
a vote of 223-198.”105  Next, the bill went to the Senate. 
In the senate law makers were also divided on the amendment. Senator Sessions 
offered an amendment to strike the provision from the bill. He described the amendment as a 
product of “one of the most ferocious lobbying efforts of Congress” in history. 106 Senator 
McCain was an especially vocal opponent.  He termed it the Dog-Ate-My-Homework Act. He 
voiced his frustration. McCain voiced his frustration with congress. He said, “There are 14 
million Americans out of work and a full day of the Senate’s time is being spent debating a 
bailout of a prominent law firm and a drug manufacturer.”107  
Section 37 of the America Invents Act demonstrates that the classical debate has taken 
a back seat to corporate money in patent law. The Senate was divided, but ultimately the 
amendment passed. “In the end, the Sessions amendment [to strike the amendment] was only 
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106 Ibid., p.650. 
107Ibid., p. 651. 
Fay 41 
 
defeated by a vote of 47-51”108 Medicine Company lobbied successfully. Although close margins 
in both chambers suggest the moral concerns of classical governance theory may still exist, 
money is the dominant force in modern patent law.  
  
                                                          
108 Ibid., p.652. 
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xiii Conclusion 
This historical analysis shows a balance of classical liberalism and classical republicanism 
in early American patent law.  In the context of American governance theory, classical 
liberalism is concerned with rights of individuals, while classical republicanism underscores the 
importance of donating useful ideas to the community.  Unlike a traditional property right, a 
patent right is time limited and conditional on a public contribution. In this way, the patent is an 
agreement that balances the inventor’s private interests and his duties as a virtuous citizen.  
The earliest American patent laws do not appear to have been heavily grounded in an 
ideological position.  It would seem that early American politicians had more important 
concerns in the 1790’s.  Legislators were preoccupied with recovering from the unsuccessful 
government under the Article of Confederation and assuming a massive debt created by the 
Revolutionary War.  Nonetheless, the courts were left to shape the structure of patent law.  In 
many instances the courts actively legislated patent law by strengthening the relationship 
between patent property and tangible property.  In other cases, by limiting the eligibility of 
patentable subjects, the courts expanded the realm of common knowledge.  
Today, on the surface, it would appear patent law has left the principles of classical 
liberalism and classical republicanism behind.  However, the evidence in this analysis 
demonstrates otherwise. Extraneous forces such as technology and globalization generate 
unanticipated legal questions. The structure of patent law requires that the courts provide 
answers based on antiquated texts and court cases with the remnants of these ideologies. The 
same debate of the purpose of a patent still exists, but the terms have changed. One striking 
example is the tremendous distortion that multinational pharmaceutical companies have 
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created. On the one hand, these companies rely heavily on patent monopolies to recover 
research and development costs. On the other hand, these companies use patents to generate 
massive profits and restrict access to life-saving medicines. This example shows how the 
succession of time has replaced the individual with the corporation and redefined the meaning 
of the common good in response to scientific progress, altering the ideological underpinnings of 
patent law. 
Inklings of classical liberalism and classical republicanism manifest in the 2011 debate, 
but these arguments are superficial. Senator Feinstein and allies appeal to other lawmakers to 
preserve the antiquated first-to-invent system. Ironically, the realities of modern patent law do 
not resemble its past. For example, substantial costs of litigation make patent law a tool for 
large entities rather than an instrument for individual inventors. Despite overwhelming 
evidence that the first-to-invent standard is outdated, a large percentage of congress takes an 
irrational and emotional position. Further irrationality in this position is seen in another 
controversial section of the 2011 debate.  Section 37 of the America Invents Act clearly shows 
that the narrative of the lone American inventor has died. Large companies purchased an 
amendment to the America Invents Act in a massive lobbying campaign.  
Patent law is unique case study because political actors enjoy a great degree of 
freedom. For example, when it comes to patent law, legislators are not subject to the pushes 
and pulls of their constituencies or partisan agendas. In the debate surrounding the first-to-file 
change, politicians on both sides of the isle gave reasons why the United States should remain a 
first-to-invent system. Despite the evidence this system does not benefit the small inventor, 
some legislators exhibit an emotional attachment to the first-to-invent system although this 
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antiquated system is no longer efficient. As one can see from this analysis, corporate America 
dominates the patent market and patent politics.  In this sense, reducing this matter to a 
timeless debate, of the individual and the community, misses the boat and ignores the realities 
of modern patent law. 
The underlying American ideological concerns of liberalism and republicanism remain 
present in spirit, but the influence of money cannot be denied. Most Americans are 
disconnected and ignorant about patent law. Ironically, the changes in patent law do matter to 
the average citizen. In an example, changes in patent law have a direct relationship to the 
pricing of pharmaceutical drugs. Without political pressure or a watchful public eye on 
upcoming legislation, the question of private interests and the common good will likely be 
buried beneath a steady buildup of pay-to-play politics.  
Relying on a romanticized political framework is irrational and dangerous when it comes 
to patent law. Patent law can be a powerful tool for change, but this requires seeing the 
realities of what patent law is today and dissipating ideological fog that clouds some 
lawmaker’s judgement. An updated patent system can spur innovation for society and allow 
small inventors and the United Sates to realize its full potential.  
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